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“Ashanti shows that even if a country is not rated AAA or AA, its commodity producers can 
still hedge successfully.” i 
 
 - Kwame Peprah, Ghana Finance Minister, 09/26/99 
 
“I am prepared to concede that we were reckless.  We took a bet on the price of gold.  We 
thought it would go down and we took a position.”ii  “We are ready to consider any 
option...and that includes the sale of all of our assets but Obuasi and Geita.”iii 
 
- Sam Jonah, CEO Ashanti Goldfields, November 1999 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The story of Ashanti Goldfields highlights the potential dangers involved in overly 
aggressive risk management.  In this case, hedging gold price risk with futures contracts, 
which are marked-to-market, against gold that is buried in the ground, led to a liquidity crisis.  
Less than two weeks after Kwame Peprah’s glowing endorsement of the firm’s practices, 
Ashanti revealed a $570m loss on its hedging, of which nearly half was owed immediately to 
creditors, and Ashanti’s shares plunged.  That story demonstrates why the debate continues in 
the gold mining industry as to the proper approach to hedging gold price risk.  In the larger 
context, corporate risk management continues to deserve and to receive a great amount of 
attention.  One need only pick up the newspaper to see a clear and present justification for 
active risk management.  Whether it’s the Enron and Andersen debacle, a rogue trader inside 
a large institution, or the attacks of September 11th, uncertainty is inherent in nearly any type 
of business activity, and no firm is completely immune to the variety of risks that can undo 
even the best managed firm.  Hence, risk management is an integral part of management’s 
duties, and evaluation of risk management strategies is a necessary component of the 
decision-making process.  
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 But does a firm’s effort to minimize the effects of these risks add real value to the 
firm?  Corporate finance theory dictates that shareholder wealth maximization should be the 
primary focus of every management decision.  Therefore, corporate risk management 
decisions (including hedging decisions) should be driven by that objective.  Presumably, firm 
managers actively manage risk if they believe that doing so will reduce expenses, improve 
cash flows, or even reduce the firm’s cost of capital (e.g. by reducing default risk).  On the 
other hand, management’s desire to minimize exposure to risk could conceivably distract it 
from the objective function of the firm - to maximize firm value (i.e. maximize the stock 
price).  In addition, while reducing risk should tend to protect bondholders, it might 
unnecessarily penalize stockholders, especially those who are already well-diversified and 
insulated from firm-specific risk.  
This paper attempts to discover if any quantitative evidence indicates that risk 
management leads to sustainable benefits for firm owners. The paper examines risk 
management practices in the North American gold mining industry from 1996 through 2000, 
encompassing the hedging practices of twenty North American gold mining firms, and their 
respective stock return regression alphas.   Peter Tufano of the Harvard Business School has 
published previous work related to this topic, most notably in 1996iv and 1998v in the Journal 
of Finance.  Professor Tufano’s papers focus on identifying the factors that influence 
management’s decision to hedge risk, and on the determinants of gold mining stock price 
exposures, most notably the exposure to the spot price of gold.  Unlike Professor Tufano’s 
work, this study is a search for a statistical correlation between the hedging practices of gold 
mining firms and their stock returns. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
Why Study the North American Gold Mining Industry 
Several characteristics suggest that the North American gold mining industry is ideal 
for academic study.  All of the firms in this industry are in the same line of business, and their 
product is an actively traded and volatile commodity.  In addition, all of the firms in this 
group share a clear exposure to gold price risk.  Gold mining firms typically manage their 
exposure to gold price risk by using a wide variety of financial instruments including 
forwards and futures contracts, gold loans, and options (puts and calls).  Perhaps most 
importantly, gold mining firms disclose their risk management activities in great detail.  Such 
disclosures show that the majority of firms in this industry use some type of hedge portfolio to 
manage gold price risk, and the composition of those portfolios are described in their annual 
reports.  The 20 gold mining firms studied meet the following criteria: 
•= Each is publicly traded either on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the 
American Stock Exchange (AMEX), or the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE).  
•= Each identifies gold mining as a primary line of business. 
•= Each is headquartered in the United States or Canada. 
Although there are a number of other gold mining firms in addition to the twenty 
selected, those firms are very small and are not actively traded on an organized exchange.  In 
addition, many of those other firms did not produce any gold for some period between 1996 
and 2000, making analysis difficult.  The twenty firms included in the study account for the 
majority of gold mining production by North American companies, and are listed in Table 1.   
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Table 1: North American Gold Mining Companies 
Firm Ticker Recent Stock Price (USD) 
2000 Revenues 
(millions of USD) 
Agnico-Eagle Mines LTD AEM $10.84 $67.00 
Barrick Gold Corporation ABX $17.30 $1,330.00 
Bema Gold Corporation BGO $0.38 $29.11 
Cambior Inc. CBJ $0.52 $199.53 
Canyon Resources Corp. CAU $1.17 $34.73 
Coeur D Alene Mines Corp. CDE $0.91 $93.17 
Crystallex International Corp. KRY $1.72 $21.76 
Dayton Mining Corporation DAY $0.35 $35.59 
Echo Bay Mines LTD ECO $0.59 $280.98 
Glamis Gold LTD GLG $3.99 $61.15 
Goldcorp Inc. GG $13.06 $39.24 
Hecla Mining Co. HL $1.04 $75.85 
Homestake Mining HM $9.05 $665.67 
Kinross Gold Corp. KGC $0.86 $288.10 
Meridian Gold Inc. MDG $11.82 $128.28 
Newmont Mining Corp NEM $19.69 $1,809.45 
Placer Dome Inc. PDG $11.77 $1,413.00 
Richmont Mines Inc. RIC $1.18 $23.05 
TVX Gold Inc. TVX $0.50 $161.62 
Vista Gold VGZ $0.07 $3.81 
  
Each firm’s performance is strongly influenced by the price of gold (historically, gold 
stocks move, percentage-wise, by a factor of two or three to one with the movement in the 
price of goldvi); therefore hedging gold price risk is an integral part of each firm’s 
management activity.  With the exception of Goldcorp, which did not hedge any of its gold 
during the period, all of the firms in the survey hedge some amount of their future gold 
production through the use of various financial instruments, such as forward sales, gold loans 
and options.  These instruments allow the firm to lock in a minimum price for at least a 
fraction of their future production.  A review of annual reports shows a wide variety in the 
extent of hedging within the industry, which is another factor that makes this industry ideal 
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for study.  For example, Barrick has traditionally hedged nearly all of its near-term 
production, whereas Glamis Gold usually hedges less than 10% of future production. 
The Hedging Debate among Gold Producers 
Despite the variety of hedging practices among gold mining companies, the debate 
over the wisdom of hedging persists between companies with extreme positions:  those that 
hedge, and those that do not.  At one end of the spectrum, Barrick claims that their Premium 
Gold Sales Program “not only increases [Barrick’s] revenues, it makes them more predictable 
and lowers risk.” and adds “We continually make more money for our product simply by 
selling it in advance.  It’s like getting paid a premium to take out insurance.”vii  At the other 
extreme, Goldcorp is quick to highlight the fact that they do not hedge any of their future gold 
production, and uses this fact as a sign of their disciplined financial management, claiming 
“Gold is money.”viii 
 As illustrated by the travails of Ashanti Goldfields, hedging can certainly introduce its 
own set of risks.  An obvious downside of hedging is the loss of profits should the price of 
gold rise dramatically.  Firms that do not hedge their gold production (or hedge very little) 
have long argued that exposure to price appreciation is more important than protection against 
downside loss should prices fall.  Those companies further claim that gold investors are 
naturally interested in the volatility of gold prices to enhance their returns, and this is why 
they invest in gold in the first place.  The Ashanti case points out another problem with 
hedging using futures contracts.  Since those instruments are marked-to-market on a daily 
basis against gold that is buried in the ground, a liquidity crisis can result if the price of gold 
increases significantly.  Since it was underground, Ashanti could not sell their gold to come 
up with the cash needed to cover their futures positions. 
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 Some anecdotal evidence suggests that aggressive hedging on the part of gold 
producers does not maximize shareholder returns.  John Hathaway, senior portfolio manager 
of the Tocqueville Gold Fund, insists that hedging has led to an over-supply in the market, 
and that this has been a prominent factor in depressing gold prices in recent years.ix  Mr. 
Hathaway’s strategy for his gold fund is to avoid holding gold stocks that in his words “hedge 
away the upside.”x  The Tocqueville Gold Fund has done well since its inception in June of 
1998, earning a three-year average annual return of 20.86% compared to the Philadelphia 
Stock Exchange Gold/Silver Index, which has earned an average annual return of 4.57% over 
the same period.xi 
 On the other hand, hedging provides gold producers with a minimum price for their 
product.  That is certainly a benefit during a period when the price of gold is going down, and 
it consistently went down each year on an average basis between 1996 and 1999.  Due to their 
extensive hedge portfolio, Barrick consistently received a higher average price for their gold 
than Goldcorp for the five years studied.  Hedging may also provide a more predictable and 
steady cash flow stream, and may help to smooth earnings.  Firms like Barrick apparently feel 
strongly that those benefits outweigh the risks associated with hedging.  In addition, firms that 
hedge attempt to adjust their portfolio based on the outlook for the gold price.  For example, 
Barrick has recently announced plans to significantly reduce the size of their hedge portfolio, 
due in part to the recent upward movement in the price of gold.  In other words, firms that 
adopt at least some hedging seem to be more flexible with their position than those that 
condemn the practice of hedging outright.  To the extent that hedging can add managerial 
flexibility, it may actually enhance the value of the firm.    
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State of the Industry 
The gold mining industry has fallen on hard times in the past few years, as the price of 
gold has stagnated around its lowest point since 1979.  From an all-time high of over $600 per 
troy ounce in 1980 (a bubble price created by the disruption of the world market for 
petroleum), the price of gold has steadily fallen to its current level of approximately $290 per 
ounce.  For the 5-year period studied, the average price of gold in 1996 was approximately 
$388 per ounce, while the average price in 2000 was approximately $279 per ounce.  As a 
result, many gold mining firms have been forced to shut down mines that are no longer 
economically viable, and others have filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection (including 
one firm in the study – Vista Gold).  The challenging economics of gold mining in recent 
years has also led to a period of consolidation in the industry.  Two of the largest producers, 
Barrick and Homestake, announced a merger in 2001, and Newmont just recently offered to 
acquire Australia’s Normandy Mining Ltd. and Franco-Nevada Mining Corp.  With few 
exceptions, the industry as a whole has under-performed the market as reflected in each firm’s 
regression alpha.  In fact, the average annualized excess return relative to the market for each 
of the twenty firms over the 5-year period is -26%. 
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III. METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY 
The methodology for this study follows four main steps.  First, I examine the 
regression alphas (i.e. the intercept that results from regressing a firm’s stock returns against 
the market) for the twenty gold mining firms studied, and test whether or not the mean is 
close to zero as one would expect.  I then test the widely held belief that investors view gold 
firms as real options by examining the relationship between stock price volatility and returns 
as measured by the alpha.  Next, I examine the relationship between hedging and alpha.  
Finally, I examine the relationship between hedging and stock price volatility. 
The regression alpha provides a simple measure of performance during the period of 
the regression relative to the capital asset pricing model.  For this study, each firm’s daily and 
weekly returns were regressed against the S&P 500 Index for each of the five years 1996 
though 2000.  In addition, each firm’s daily returns were regressed against the broad Stock 
File Index1 (SFI) from The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database.  I 
calculate the mean alpha for each year and across all five years, and determine a 95% 
confidence interval to test the hypothesis that the average alpha is close to zero2. 
Those who are opposed to hedging argue, among other things, that because investors 
view gold firms as real options, any reduction in cash flow volatility through hedging will 
necessarily make the firm less valuable (i.e. volatility is a key determinant of option value, 
including so-called real options).  If investors indeed view gold firms as real options, then one 
would expect a correlation between volatility and alpha.  Although it would be most useful to 
use the volatility of cash flows for this test, I was not able to collect this data, so I use the 
                                                 
1 The CRSP Stock File Index includes over 8,000 securities. 
2 All statistical analysis that was performed for the study was done using MINITAB statistical software. 
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weekly volatility of stock returns3 as a substitute for cash flows.  I also add a dummy variable 
for each year (1996-1999) in order to pool the results across time.  The hypothesis is that 
alpha will increase with stock price volatility. 
In order to determine if hedging practices have an impact on shareholder value, I 
search for statistical significance between a firm’s alpha and the extent of hedging employed 
by the firm.  The extent of risk management for each firm is determined by calculating the 
effective number of ounces of gold that each firm has effectively hedged, or sold forward.  
Each of the firms studied report on an annual basis their hedging portfolio of gold-related 
instruments.  Although quarterly data would be more useful for this study, I was only able to 
find annual data for each firm.  For firms that hold options, an effective portfolio delta must 
be calculated.  This portfolio delta relates their options position to an equivalent number of 
ounces of gold that have effectively been hedged.  To illustrate, a hypothetical example of the 
hedge portfolio and delta calculation for one firm at the end of 1996 is presented in Table 2. 
Table 2:  Calculating the Equivalent Hedge Position for a Firm at the end of 1996 
 1997 1998 1999 
 Ounces Price 
(USD) 
Ounces Price 
(USD) 
Ounces Price 
(USD) 
Forward sales 1,000 350 5,000 360 10,000 370 
Puts (purchased) 5,000 350 1,000 360 500 370 
Calls (sold) 10,000 415 5,000 420 1,000 425 
Total: 16,000  11,000  11,500  
Grand Total: 38,500      
Calculation of Portfolio Delta 
Position  Ounces Delta4 Equivalent Ounces 
Forward sales (all) 16,000 -1 -16,000 
                                                 
3 The standard deviation of weekly returns for each calendar year was calculated by taking the weekly closing 
prices for each firm from the Yahoo Finance website. 
4 The delta for future and forward positions equals –1.  The delta for an options position is calculated using the 
Black-Scholes model for option pricing which uses as its inputs the maturity of the option, the risk-free rate, the 
gold lease rate, the spot price of gold, the strike price of the option, and the annualized volatility of gold prices.  
For this study, the risk-free rate used is 5.1% (average 10-year T-note), the annual gold lease rate is 1.42%, and 
the standard deviation of annual gold returns is 30.13% (average over the past 30 years).  In addition, the spot 
price is taken as the average price of gold for the year.  The average price of gold for the years 1996, 1997, 1998, 
1999, and 2000 is 387.81, 331.02, 294.24, 278.98, and 279.11 respectively.  All options are assumed to be 
European in style, which means that they can be exercised only on the last day of the period.  
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Put options maturing in 1997 5,000 -.270 -1,350 
Put options maturing in 1998 1,000 -.288 -288 
Put options maturing in 1999 500 -.287 -144 
Call options maturing in 1997 10,000 -.519 -5,190 
Call options maturing in 1998 5,000 -.579 -2,895 
Call options maturing in 1999 1,000 -.617 -617 
Total Equivalent Ounces in Hedge Position   26,484 
 
The top panel of the above table illustrates the typical presentation of a firm’s gold 
derivative portfolio as reported in their annual report.  The bottom panel, which is typically 
not presented in the annual report, calculates the equivalent number of ounces of gold (in this 
case 26,484) that the firm would need to hold in a replicating portfolio to their hedged 
position.  In order to create a multiple that can be compared across firms of different size, this 
amount is then divided by the firm’s anticipated three-year future production, as well as by 
the firm’s stock of Proven and Probable Reserves5 (PPR). 
Compiling the hedging data for twenty firms over five years was accomplished by 
sifting through the footnotes of 100 annual reports.  Several of the firms studied use a broad 
variety of instruments to hedge the various forms of risk that they face.  For example, some of 
the firms that are also involved in silver mining use silver-based derivatives in addition to 
gold derivatives in their hedge portfolios.  Other firms use various currency and interest rate 
hedging instruments as well.  For this study, I have only included each firm’s gold derivative 
portfolios, since this is the primary method by which each firm hedges gold price risk.   
One would expect the hedging factor to be a problematic causal variable based on the 
measurement process described above.  That is, one should assume that the error in the 
hedging factor will cause a disturbance in the dependent variable (i.e. alpha), and will 
therefore bias the results.  This fact requires one to use a two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
                                                 
5 Three-year future production is estimated based on the predicted production for the following year, which is 
usually reported by the firm, as well as management’s discussion of future prospects.  The stock of proven and 
probable reserves is usually reported in each firm’s annual report. 
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regression methodxii.  The 2SLS method is an econometric technique that enables one to 
“clean up” the offending variable (i.e. the hedging factor) by performing the regression in two 
stages.   
In the first stage, I regress the hedging factor against a number of instruments 
(independent variables) in order to create a regression equation that can be used to generate 
“expected” hedging factors.  Nineteen instruments are included in stage one6; these include 
the cash balance of the firm7, the balance of current assets, operating income before 
depreciation (EBITDA), the cost of goods sold (COGS), the balance of long term debt, long 
term debt per common equity, the current portion of long term debt, the debt due in one year, 
the balance of convertible debt, the balance of subordinated debt, the balance of debt notes, 
total debentures, other long term debt, net income, total current executive compensation, total 
executive restrictive stock holdings, total long term incentive payouts8, annual revenues, and a 
dummy variable that identifies if the firm is engaged in another business besides gold mining9 
(e.g. silver mining, or mining for other minerals). 
In stage two, I regress alpha against the new expected hedging variable and the yearly 
dummy variables.  If one believes that hedging reduces volatility, then one would expect 
hedging to be negatively correlated with the alpha. 
 In the final step, I explicitly examine the effect of hedging on volatility by regressing 
the weekly volatility of stock returns against the hedging variable and yearly dummy 
variables.  In this case, the hypothesis is that hedging will reduce volatility. 
                                                 
6 Nineteen instruments were required to push the adjusted R2 of the regression up to 90%. 
7 Annual financial statement data was taken from the COMPUSTAT database. 
8 All data related to executive compensation was taken from the COMPUSTAT database.  For the study, I took 
the sum of all amounts paid to a firm’s executives.  The COMPUSTAT database did not include data for all of 
the firms in the study, but any data that was available was used. 
9 Determined from information presented on each firm’s website and in their annual reports. 
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  IV. FINDINGS 
The resulting regression alphas for each firm are presented below in Table 3. 
Table 3: Gold Mining Firm Regression Alphas10 
Year Firm  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
S&P Daily 0.05 -0.32 -0.05 0.30 -0.02 
S&P Weekly 0.18 -1.90 -0.26 1.49 -0.16 Agnico-Eagle Mines LTD 
SFI Daily11 0.09 -0.33 -0.02 0.31 -0.03 
S&P Daily 0.03 -0.15 0.03 0.01 0.00 
S&P Weekly -0.07 -0.72 -0.04 0.10 0.01 Barrick Gold Corporation 
SFI Daily 0.05 -0.18 0.04 0.01 -0.01 
S&P Daily 0.52 -0.26 -0.29 0.16 0.00 
S&P Weekly 2.53 -1.18 -1.68 0.17 -1.44 Bema Gold Corporation 
SFI Daily 0.55 -0.32 -0.23 0.15 0.04 
S&P Daily 0.12 -0.32 -0.05 -0.26 -0.07 
S&P Weekly 0.61 -1.54 -0.51 -1.12 -1.92 Cambior Inc. 
SFI Daily 0.14 -0.39 -0.02 -0.26 -0.14 
S&P Daily 0.04 -0.21 -0.03 1.09 1.36 
S&P Weekly 0.20 -1.41 -1.47 5.34 5.93 Canyon Resources Corp. 
SFI Daily 0.12 -0.22 0.05 1.14 0.31 
S&P Daily -0.01 -0.18 -0.20 -0.06 -0.24 
S&P Weekly -0.17 -0.91 -1.13 -0.02 -1.55 Coeur D Alene Mines Corp. 
SFI Daily 0.01 -0.18 -0.16 -0.03 -0.24 
S&P Daily 0.71 -0.24 0.71 0.21 
S&P Weekly 2.50 -0.78 2.99 0.88 Crystallex International Corp. 
SFI Daily 
N/A12 
0.06 -0.24 0.81 0.13 
S&P Daily 0.17 -0.44 -0.36 1.09 4.15 
S&P Weekly 0.56 -2.15 -2.88 0.18 15.81 Dayton Mining Corporation 
SFI Daily 0.25 -0.43 -0.35 1.04 -0.49 
S&P Daily -0.19 -0.29 -0.02 0.00 -0.30 
S&P Weekly -0.97 -1.47 0.44 -0.28 -2.13 Echo Bay Mines LTD 
SFI Daily -0.13 -0.33 0.02 0.00 -0.24 
S&P Daily 0.10 -0.26 -0.17 0.12 0.07 
S&P Weekly 0.20 -1.10 -1.05 5.62 0.22 Glamis Gold LTD 
SFI Daily 0.11 -0.25 -0.14 0.10 0.03 
S&P Daily -0.15 -0.23 0.22 0.05 0.08 
S&P Weekly -0.37 -0.92 0.86 0.32 0.30 Goldcorp Inc. 
SFI Daily 0.16 -0.27 0.23 0.04 0.06 
S&P Daily -0.10 0.04 -0.04 -0.25 -0.22 
S&P Weekly -0.70 0.19 -0.47 -1.21 -1.79 Hecla Mining Co. 
SFI Daily -0.07 0.00 -0.03 -0.23 -0.21 
S&P Daily -0.05 -0.17 0.06 0.00 -0.20 
S&P Weekly -0.38 -0.90 0.24 0.03 -0.90 Homestake Mining 
SFI Daily 0.00 -0.19 0.07 0.01 -0.20 
S&P Daily -0.11 -0.28 -0.10 0.02 -0.26 
S&P Weekly -0.46 -1.45 -0.59 0.16 -1.99 Kinross Gold Corp. 
SFI Daily -0.02 -0.26 -0.04 0.01 -0.29 
S&P Daily 0.06 -0.11 0.41 0.16 0.11 Meridian Gold Inc. 
S&P Weekly 0.39 -0.58 2.58 0.61 0.42 
                                                 
10 All alphas are presented in percentage terms as opposed to decimal terms (e.g. 0.5% as opposed to 0.005). 
11 The broad Stock File Index from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. 
12 Crystallex was not publicly traded in 1996. 
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 SFI Daily 0.03 -0.09 0.42 0.15 0.09 
S&P Daily -0.01 -0.18 -0.11 0.22 -0.05 
S&P Weekly -0.18 -0.92 -0.58 1.14 -0.23 Newmont Mining Corp 
SFI Daily 0.02 -0.21 -0.09 0.22 -0.10 
S&P Daily -0.05 -0.22 -0.02 0.04 0.03 
S&P Weekly -0.37 -1.10 -0.07 0.32 0.09 Placer Dome Inc. 
SFI Daily -0.03 -0.24 -0.01 0.05 0.01 
S&P Daily -0.19 0.08 -0.11 0.02 
S&P Weekly -0.88 0.15 -0.51 -0.56 Richmont Mines Inc. 
SFI Daily 
N/A13 
-0.22 0.07 -0.02 0.01 
S&P Daily 0.03 -0.28 -0.13 -0.16 1.20 
S&P Weekly 0.13 -1.57 -0.77 -0.72 4.91 TVX Gold Inc. 
SFI Daily 0.08 -0.28 -0.10 -0.16 -0.06 
S&P Daily -0.06 -0.17 0.53 0.81 0.72 
S&P Weekly -0.19 -1.91 0.05 0.31 -0.37 Vista Gold 
SFI Daily 0.19 -0.27 2.09 0.80 0.89 
 
The mean alphas, as well as 95% confidence intervals for the means, for each of the 
five years are presented below in Table 4.  Confidence intervals that include zero are 
highlighted in bold. 
Table 4: Mean Alphas for Gold Firms 1996 - 2000 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 5-Year Average 
S&P Daily Mean 0.022 -0.176 -0.024 0.197 0.330 0.070 
95% Con. Interval (-0.056, 0.099) (-0.283, -0.068) (-0.125, 0.077) (0.007, 0.387) (-0.141, 0.800) (-0.052, 0.197) 
S&P Week Mean 0.052 -0.996 -0.398 0.746 0.777 0.036 
95% Con. Interval (-0.319, 0.424) (-1.454, -0.538) (-0.908, 0.112) (-0.125, 1.617) (-1.143, 2.696) (-0.381, 0.470) 
SFI Daily Mean 0.086 -0.230 0.078 0.207 -0.022 0.024 
95% Con. Interval (0.012, 0.161) (-0.285, -0.175) (-0.157, 0.313) (0.016, 0.398) (-0.152, 0.108) (-0.070, 0.118) 
 
As indicated by the confidence intervals in Table 4, the mean alphas for the twenty 
firms in the sample over the five years are consistently close to zero.  The remainder of the 
study examines the differences between alphas of the individual firms (i.e. why are some 
firms’ alphas higher than others). 
In order to test the view that investors view gold firms as real options, I regressed the 
Stock File Index alphas14 against the weekly volatility of stock returns15.  The results of this 
                                                 
13 Richmont was not publicly traded during 1996. 
14 The broad Stock File Index was used rather than the S&P because of the consistently higher R2’s for 
regressions against the stock file index.  I did perform similar regressions against the S&P 500, and found similar 
results, although these are not presented here. 
15 Weekly volatility represents the standard deviation of weekly returns for the calendar year. 
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regression are shown below.  The standard error for each coefficient is presented in 
parentheses under each term, with bold indicating statistical significance16. 
Regression Coefficients Where the Dependent Variable is SFI Daily Alpha 
Adjusted 
R2 (%) Constant 
Weekly 
Volatility 
Year 1 
Dummy 
Year 2 
Dummy 
Year 3 
Dummy 
Year 4 
Dummy 
59.8 -0.37135 (0.06051) 
3.5705 
(0.3445) 
0.25947 
(0.07442) 
-0.10955 
(0.07163) 
-0.03703 
(0.07220) 
0.18392 
(0.07113) 
  
Based on the high T-statistic of weekly volatility (10.36) in the regression above, it 
appears that gold firms do behave like real options when it comes to volatility.  This supports 
the hypothesis that a reduction in volatility (either in cash flows or stock returns) will make 
the firm less valuable.  The next step is to explicitly examine the effects of hedging on alpha.   
Each of the hedging factors for the twenty firms over the five-year period was 
determined using the delta calculation method described in the previous section.  These are 
presented below in Table 5. 
Table 5:  Gold Hedge Portfolios as a Fraction of Production and Reserves17 
Year Firm  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Prod. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2991 0.2717 Agnico-Eagle Mines LTDxiii PPR 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0748 0.0709 
Prod. 0.7444 1.0100 1.0874 1.0072 1.2273 Barrick Gold Corporationxiv PPR 0.1311 0.2008 0.2428 0.2089 0.2727 
Prod. 0.4267 0.4228 0.2119 0.4768 0.6011 Bema Gold Corporationxv PPR 0.0646 0.0166 0.0491 0.0163 0.1765 
Prod. 0.1209 0.7811 1.2255 1.1316 0.9598 Cambior Inc.xvi PPR 0.0434 0.2968 0.5232 0.3913 0.6019 
Prod. 1.1452 0.7325 0.3333 0.1623 0.0171 Canyon Resources Corp.xvii PPR 0.3600 0.2334 0.1433 0.0061 0.0009 
Prod. 0.1715 0.1944 0.2813 0.3354 0.4215 Coeur D Alene Mines Corp.xviii PPR 0.0431 0.0565 0.0482 0.0619 0.0439 
Prod. 0.0000 0.0000 0.5700 0.6158 0.2991 Crystallex International Corp.xix PPR 0.0000 0.0000 0.4771 N/A18 N/A19 
Prod. 0.3174 0.1132 0.1209 0.0643 0.0000 Dayton Mining Corporationxx PPR 0.0822 0.0403 0.0580 0.0598 0.0000 
                                                 
16 Statistical significance for each factor corresponds to a T-statistic greater than 2.0 or less than -2.0.  Each T-
statistic is simply the coefficient divided by the standard error for that coefficient. 
17 Presented as the number of ounces of gold that are hedged divided by the number of ounces of gold that are 
expected to be produced over the next three years (Prod.), and by the number of ounces of gold in the firm’s 
stock of proven and probable reserves (PPR).  
18 Crystallex did not report their stock of PPR in the 1999 annual report. 
19 Crystallex did not report their stock of PPR in the 2000 annual report. 
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Prod. 0.1859 0.6145 0.5446 0.1548 0.1173 Echo Bay Mines LTDxxi PPR 0.0455 0.1257 0.1117 0.0596 0.0449 
Prod. 0.0160 0.0239 0.0098 0.1531 0.0419 Glamis Gold LTDxxii PPR 0.0034 0.0039 0.0020 0.0327 0.0121 
Prod. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Goldcorp Inc.xxiii PPR 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Prod. 0.1057 0.0515 0.0250 0.7899 0.5314 Hecla Mining Co.xxiv PPR 0.1056 0.0277 0.0116 0.3939 0.2994 
Prod. 0.1046 0.1469 0.1943 0.1265 0.2402 Homestake Miningxxv PPR 0.0333 0.0570 0.0697 0.0445 0.0785 
Prod. 0.1476 0.0470 0.0750 0.3560 0.2471 Kinross Gold Corp.xxvi PPR 0.0780 0.0460 0.0361 0.1786 0.1071 
Prod. 0.0921 0.1057 0.0568 0.4131 0.1931 Meridian Gold Inc.xxvii PPR 0.0389 0.0332 0.0360 0.2930 0.1367 
Prod. 0.0556 0.0694 0.0161 0.1416 0.0940 Newmont Mining Corpxxviii PPR 0.0091 0.0188 0.0048 0.0375 0.0268 
Prod. 0.6364 0.6399 0.5516 1.0056 0.8017 Placer Dome Inc.xxix PPR 0.1849 0.1606 0.1618 0.1294 0.1536 
Prod. 0.2278 0.1507 0.0316 0.0299 0.0400 Richmont Mines Inc.xxx PPR 0.1145 0.1027 0.0227 0.0287 0.0232 
Prod. 0.6828 1.0269 0.1994 0.3800 0.4480 TVX Gold Inc.xxxi PPR 0.1615 0.2666 0.0247 0.0366 0.0329 
Prod. 0.0000 0.8491 0.4762 0.0000 0.0000 Vista Goldxxxii PPR 0.0000 0.4699 0.4149 0.0000 0.0000 
 
In order to “clean up” these raw hedging factors, stage one of the 2SLS regressed the 
fraction of 3-year future production hedged20 (as opposed to the fraction of proven and 
probable reserves hedged) against nineteen instrument variables.  The results of this 
regression are presented below:  
Regression Coefficients Where the Dependent Variable is Hedging Factor 
Adjusted R2:  90.4% 
Instrument Variable Regression Coefficient Standard Error21 
Constant -0.00848 (0.06168) 
Cash Balance (MM$) 0.003756 (0.001282) 
Current Assets (MM$) -0.005468 (0.001310) 
Long Term Debt (MM$) -0.0039857 (0.0009075) 
EBITDA (MM$) 0.006094 (0.002498) 
COGS (MM$) 0.005614 (0.002569) 
Long Term Debt/Common Equity 0.17905 (0.04361) 
Current Portion of Long Term Debt (MM$) 0.012991 (0.003922) 
Debt Due in One Year (MM$) -0.011847 (0.003390) 
Debt  - Convertible (MM$) 0.0034090 (0.0009509) 
                                                 
20 Hedge ratios as a fraction of near-term production were used rather than as a fraction of proven & probable 
reserves because firms generally report their hedge positions (and presumably make their hedging decisions) in 
terms of production rather than reserves.    
21 Bold indicates statistical significance. 
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Debt - Subordinated (MM$) 0.20758 (0.03334) 
Debt - Notes (MM$) 0.006064 (0.001739) 
Debt - Debentures (MM$) 0.0040098 (0.0007319) 
Long Term Debt - Other (MM$) 0.0039204 (0.0007629) 
Net Income (MM$) -0.0006140 (0.0001876) 
Total Current Executive Compensation ($Thou.) 0.00017273 (0.00005225) 
Executive Restricted Stock Holdings ($ value) 0.0012156 (0.0004141) 
Long Term Incentive Payouts -0.0005693 (0.0001898) 
Additional Business Line Dummy -0.11918 (0.08778) 
Annual Revenues -0.003723 (0.002309) 
 
This regression equation was then used to create expected hedge factors for each firm 
over the five years.  These are presented below in Table 6. 
Table 6: Predicted Gold Hedge Portfolios as a Fraction of Three-Year Future Production 
Year Firm 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Agnico-Eagle Mines LTD -0.0557 -0.0279 -0.1979 -0.0542 0.0295 
Barrick Gold Corporation 0.7593 0.9992 1.1658 0.8901 1.2628 
Bema Gold Corporation -0.2430 -0.2401 -0.1755 -0.1120 -0.1147 
Cambior Inc. 0.1317 0.2419 0.3871 0.5759 0.8120 
Canyon Resources Corp. -0.0671 -0.0294 -0.1036 -0.0997 -0.0824 
Coeur D Alene Mines Corp. 0.2600 0.1147 0.2933 0.3483 1.4954 
Crystallex International Corp. N/A -0.0272 -0.0243 -0.0195 0.0159 
Dayton Mining Corporation -0.0509 -0.1037 -0.1436 -0.1337 -0.1117 
Echo Bay Mines LTD 0.1532 0.4344 0.3847 0.1743 0.3239 
Glamis Gold LTD -0.0027 0.0117 0.0575 0.0421 0.1296 
Goldcorp Inc. -0.0639 -0.0564 -0.0453 -0.1052 -0.0540 
Hecla Mining Co. 0.0812 0.0830 0.1315 0.7994 0.5219 
Homestake Mining 0.0952 0.1209 0.2017 0.1863 0.2199 
Kinross Gold Corp. -0.3439 -0.2926 0.7961 0.9560 -0.0809 
Meridian Gold Inc. -0.1620 -0.1726 -0.0602 -0.0069 0.0123 
Newmont Mining Corp -0.0018 0.1378 0.0992 0.0643 0.0901 
Placer Dome Inc. 0.6600 0.7694 0.5846 0.9296 0.6764 
Richmont Mines Inc. N/A 0.0409 0.0208 -0.0041 -0.0051 
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TVX Gold Inc. 0.2712 0.0225 0.0055 -0.2535 -0.0294 
Vista Gold -0.0956 0.1222 -0.0178 -0.0055 -0.0178 
 
Finally, the daily Stock File Index alphas were regressed against these new hedging 
factors along with the weekly volatility of stock returns and the yearly dummy variables.  The 
results of this regression are presented below, along with the standard error of each coefficient 
in parentheses with statistical significance represented by bold.  
Regression Coefficients Where the Dependent Variable is SFI Daily Alpha 
Adjusted 
R2 (%) Constant 
Hedging 
Factor 
Year 1 
Dummy 
Year 2 
Dummy 
Year 3 
Dummy 
Year 4 
Dummy 
17.2 0.02931 (0.07566) 
-0.19846 
(0.09054) 
0.0708 
(0.1060) 
-0.2372 
(0.1028) 
0.0815 
(0.1022) 
0.2190 
(0.1020) 
 
Based on the standard error of the hedging factor coefficient in the regression above, 
there appears to be a statistically significant negative correlation between hedging and alpha.   
The final test performed in the study was to examine the relationship between hedging 
and stock price volatility.  After all, the reduction of volatility is commonly considered an 
effect, or benefit, of hedging.  In order to test this commonly held belief, I regressed the 
weekly volatility of the stock price against the predicted hedging factor and the yearly dummy 
variables.  The results of this regression are presented below.  
Regression Coefficients Where the Dependent Variable is Weekly Stock Price Volatility 
Adjusted 
R2 (%) Constant 
Hedging 
Factor 
Year 1 
Dummy 
Year 2 
Dummy 
Year 3 
Dummy 
Year 4 
Dummy 
16.0 0.10893 (0.01551) 
-0.04271 
(0.01856) 
-0.05051 
(0.02173) 
-0.03384 
(0.02107) 
0.03433 
(0.02096) 
0.01041 
(0.02091) 
  
 Based on the standard error of the hedging factor in the regression above, there 
appears to be a statistically significant negative correlation between hedging and stock price 
volatility.  This confirms the hypothesis that hedging reduces stock price volatility. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
The strong correlation between volatility and alpha suggests that the market indeed views 
gold firms as real options.  The regression of daily alpha against the weekly volatility of stock 
returns resulted in a coefficient for the volatility of 3.57 and a T-statistic of 10.36.  This supports 
the original hypothesis that investors value volatility when it comes to gold mining stocks. 
There also appears to be a statistically significant correlation between the extent of gold 
hedging and the performance of the firm’s stock price as measured by the regression alpha.  The 
2SLS regression that includes the hedging factor and the yearly dummy variables resulted in a T-
statistic of –2.19 for the annual hedging factor.  The coefficient of -0.1985 indicates that the 
more management hedges gold price risk with gold derivatives, the worse it is for the return of 
their firm’s stock as measured by the regression alpha.  This is a significant finding, for it implies 
that gold mining firms that aggressively hedge gold price risk are not maximizing shareholder 
value.  These results also provide empirical ammunition to the argument against hedging in the 
gold mining industry.   
Furthermore, the regression linking hedging with volatility yielded a similar statistically 
significant relationship between the two.  This follows our intuition, since one of the primary 
motivations for hedging in general is the reduction of volatility.  Of course, the reduction of 
volatility in cash flows may not translate into a reduction in volatility of the stock price.  In any 
case, it appears that while Barrick’s hedging efforts make the firm’s revenues more predictable, 
and may lower risk, this is counter to a shareholder wealth maximization strategy in the gold 
mining industry.  Indeed, these results suggest that investors actually place a premium on more 
risk for gold mining firms. 
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Decisions regarding risk management practices are clearly influenced by a number of 
factors, not the least of which relate to managers’ efforts to maximize their own utility22.  One 
could argue that an effective risk management strategy can help to smooth earnings.  But the 
results of this study indicate that even if this is true, overly aggressive risk management may not 
maximize value for firm owners.  This suggests that decisions regarding risk management are not 
prompted by a desire to maximize shareholder wealth, but by other factorsxxxiii. 
Although these results may hold for the North American gold mining industry over the 
period studied, additional research should be performed to determine if they hold in other 
industries.  Investors in those other industries may apply a premium to the value of risk reduction 
through hedging (e.g. if volatility of cash flows is strictly frowned upon).  As for the North 
American gold mining industry, these results indicate that risk reduction through hedging is of 
limited value to shareholders who are primarily interested in wealth maximization.  
                                                 
22 In his article published in the Journal of Finance, 1996, Peter Tufano finds that management’s hedging practices 
are largely influenced by the form of compensation they receive (e.g. stock versus options).  
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